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one-half, on the output gap, and (3) an "estimated" Taylor rule from a regression of the federal funds rate on a constant, the inflation rate, and the output gap. We identify monetary policy eras by allowing for changes in the mean of the policy rule deviations with tests for multiple structural breaks, with discretionary eras defined by large deviations and rules-based eras defined by small deviations. Using six loss functions involving inflation and unemployment, we show that economic performance is uniformly better in rules-based than in discretionary eras, with the ratio of the loss during discretionary eras to the loss during rules-based eras largest for the original Taylor rule, next largest for the modified Taylor rule, and smallest for the estimated Taylor rule.
In this paper, we analyze the implications of the Directive Policy Rule. Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that the policy rule legislation had been in effect from 1954, when federal funds rate data are first available, through 2015. When would deviations from the rule have triggered congressional testimony? Since this is a counterfactual, not a simulation, we assume that the existence of the legislation would not have altered the Fed's policy rate. We consider how, given its desired policy rate, whether or not the Fed would have complied with the legislation, not how the legislation might have changed Fed behavior. Since the Directive Policy Rule is chosen by the Fed, this naturally leads us to consider which version of the rule would have minimized deviations during various periods.
We need to make several choices in order to define the scope of our inquiry. First, we use only real-time data which was publicly available. In particular, we do not use Greenbook output gap and inflation forecast data because (1) is was not publicly available except after a long lag, currently seven years, and (2) even if it were to be publicly available, using Fed generated output gaps and inflation forecasts would create a (perceived or actual) moral hazard problem that seems undesirable. Second, the legislation does not define what constitutes a deviation. Based on the results in Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, Papell, and Prodan (2014) , where rules-based (discretionary) eras closely correspond to departures of the federal funds rate of less than (greater than) two percent from the rate implied by the original Taylor (1993) rule, we define a deviation as a greater than two percent departure of the federal funds rate from the rate implied by whatever rule is being used. Third, the legislation does not specify exactly how a deviation would trigger congressional testimony. Since the Fed Chair currently testifies semi-annually to both House and Senate committees, we define a deviation of greater than two percent at the time of the testimony as the criteria for not being in compliance. 3 We consider two candidates for the Directive Policy Rule. The first is the original Taylor (1993) rule. The second is the modified Taylor rule with a coefficient of one, instead of one-half, on the output gap. In the first case, the Directive Policy Rule would conform exactly to the Reference Policy Rule. In the second case, the arguments advanced by Yellen (2012 Yellen ( , 2015 provide examples for how to justify why the two rules were different.
We divide the period from 1954 to 2015 based on data availability. Between 1954 and 1990 , there are no official real-time measures of the output gap, so we use real-time data on the GDP deflator and real GDP from the Philadelphia Fed to construct measures of inflation and the output gap. Because no single method of detrending produces output gaps for the full 60 year period that are consistent with real-time approximations using Okun's Law during recessions, we use linear detrending until 1973 and quadratic detrending thereafter. Starting in 1991, real-time output gaps can be calculated from the Philadelphia Fed real-time GDP data and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates of potential GDP and a wider range of real-time inflation rates are available.
We first consider the period from 1954 through 1990. Suppose that the original Taylor rule was the Directive Policy Rule. Fed policy adhered to the rule in the sense that the deviations would not have triggered congressional testimony during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the early part of the Johnson administration, with short deviations just prior to the recessions of 1957-1958 and 1960-1961 . The first extended deviation occurred in 1967 and 1968, with the federal funds rate below the prescribed rate. Policy was back on track during the Nixon administration, with only short deviation during the early 1970s. Starting in1975, however, there was an extended period of negative deviations during the Great Inflation followed by an We organize our analysis around several well-known examples of monetary policy evaluation using Taylor rules. Poole (2007) and Taylor (2007) report large deviations from the original Taylor rule for 2003 -2005 with CBO output gaps and CPI inflation. We follow Poole by using real-time data, and find that the deviations were greater than two percent in 2001, 2003 -2004, 2008 -2009, and 2011 -2015 Taylor (2007) , the deviations were large enough to trigger congressional testimony for most quarters between 2012 and 2015. Yellen (2012) argued that the modified Taylor rule with a higher output gap coefficient was both a better description of Fed policy and closer to optimal policy than the original Taylor Most recently, Yellen (2015) argued that the fixed equilibrium real interest rate of two in the original Taylor rule should be replaced by a time-varying rate. We compute deviations using 
Policy Rule Deviations
The centerpiece of the proposed policy rule legislation is the Directive Policy Rule. This rule is chosen by the Fed, and describes how the federal funds rate would respond to a change in inflation and one or more measures of real economic activity. There are two important aspects of the legislation that are designed to ensure transparency. If the Fed deviated from its rule, the Chair of the Fed would be required to testify before the appropriate congressional committees as to why it is not in compliance. In addition, the report must include a statement as to whether the Directive Policy Rule substantially conforms to the "Reference Policy Rule," which is the Taylor (1993) rule. Since the original Taylor rule uses the output gap, we restrict our attention to rules where the output gap is the only measure of real economic activity. This would facilitate the statement comparing the directive and reference policy rules.
4 Taylor (1993) proposed the following monetary policy rule:
where t i is the target level of the short-term nominal interest rate, t π is the inflation rate, * π is the target level of inflation, t y is the output gap, the percent deviation of actual real GDP from an estimate of its potential level, t π -* π is the inflation gap, the percentage deviation of inflation from the target level of inflation, and * R is the equilibrium level of the real interest rate.
Combining terms,
where φ α + = 1 and *
Taylor postulated that the output and inflation gaps enter the central bank's reaction function with equal weights of 0.5 and that the equilibrium level of the real interest rate and the inflation target were both equal to 2 percent, producing the following equation,
The most widely used alternative to the original Taylor rule increases the size of the coefficient on the output gap from 0.5 to 1.0, producing the following specification.
We call this rule the modified Taylor rule. Rudebusch (2010) and Yellen (2012) use variants of this rule to justify unconventional policies after the federal funds rate hit the zero lower bound.
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Policy rule deviations are defined as the difference between the actual federal funds rate and the interest rate target implied by either the original or the modified Taylor rule with the above coefficients.
In order for our analysis to be operational, we need to make several assumptions. The proposed legislation does not specify how large a deviation would need to be in order to trigger congressional testimony. In Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, Papell, and Prodan (2014), we use Bai and Perron (1998) and Perron and Qu (2006) tests for multiple structural changes to define rulesbased (low) and discretionary (high) deviations eras for various policy rules. For the original Taylor (1993) rule, which is the Reference Policy Rule in the proposed legislation, the rulesbased (discretionary) eras closely correspond to departures of the federal funds rate of less than (greater then) two percent from the rate implied by the rule, with a correlation of 0.80 between the metrics. We therefore define a deviation as a greater than two percent departure of the federal funds rate from the rate implied by whatever Directive Policy Rule is being used. Yellen (2012) called this rule the "balanced-approach" rule. We use the term "modified" in order to utilize more neutral language. 6 The draft Senate bill would replace the current semi-annual monetary policy reports to Congress by the Fed with a quarterly report published by the FOMC, while still requiring the Fed Chair to testify semi-annually. This would increase the number of reported short-run deviations, but would not change the results for extended periods.
Real-Time Data
The prescribed Taylor rule interest rate is calculated from data on inflation and the output gap. Following Orphanides (2001) , the vast majority of research on the Taylor rule uses real-time data that was available to policymakers at the time that interest rate setting decisions were made.
In order to implement the policy rule legislation, the data also needs to be publicly available.
This rules out Greenbook data unless the Fed changes its release policy, as it is currently only available with about a seven year lag.
Real-Time Data from 1954 to 1990
The Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists (RTDSM), originated by Croushore and
Stark (2001) We construct inflation rates as the year-over-year change in the GDP Deflator, the ratio of nominal to real GDP. While the Fed has emphasized different inflation rates at different points in time, real-time GDP inflation is by far the longest available real-time inflation series. This is the inflation rate that Taylor (1993) calculated with revised data.
In order to construct the output gap, the percentage deviation of real GDP around potential GDP, the real GDP data needs to be detrended. We use real-time detrending, where the and so on, replicating the information available to policymakers. The lag reflects the fact that GDP data for a given quarter is not known until after the end of the quarter. In the context of the proposed legislation, because the congressional testimony would be in February and July, the relevant deviations with real-time data are for the first and third quarters, reflecting calculations based on fourth and second quarter data.
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The three leading methods of detrending are linear, quadratic, and Hodrick-Prescott (HP).
Real-time output gaps using these methods are depicted in Figure 1 . In contrast with output gaps constructed using revised data, where the trends are estimated for the entire sample, there is no necessity for the positive output gaps to equal the negative output gaps. While there are considerable differences among the gaps, the negative output gaps correspond closely with NBER recession dates for all three methods.
None of the three real-time output gaps provide a good approximation of the perceptions of policymakers over this period. Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy and Papell (2012) 
Real-Time Data from 1991 to 2015
The time span for our more recent analysis is determined by Congressional Budget Office (CBO) data availability. To calculate real-time CBO output gaps, we use quarterly estimates of potential GDP from "The Budget and Economic Outlook" published in January/February of every year since 1991. Starting in 2007, due to CBO's frequent and substantial potential GDP revisions, we also use data from the August updates. This data is combined with real-time actual GDP from the Philadelphia Fed RTDSM to obtain the output gap as the log-difference between 8 The results are robust to switching from linear to quadratic detrending anytime between 1971:Q2 and 1976:Q1.
the two values. Because GDP is updated quarterly and potential GDP is updated annually or semi-annually, we use forecasts of potential GDP between the CBO updates. 
Policy Rule Legislation from 1954 to 1990
We construct the following counterfactual. Suppose the policy rule legislation had been in place from 1954, when federal funds rate data is first available, through 1990. When would the deviations from the Directive Policy Rule have been large enough for the Fed to not be in compliance and trigger congressional testimony? As discussed above, we use the federal funds rate as the policy rate, the GDP deflator to calculate real-time inflation, and linear and quadratic 
Policy Rule Legislation from 1991 to 2015
We proceed to construct the same counterfactual as above using data from 1991:Q1, when real-time CBO output gaps are available, through 2015:Q1. The question that we pose is again when would the deviations from the Directive Policy Rule have been large enough for the Fed to not be in compliance and trigger congressional testimony? For the more recent period, the Directive Policy Rule will also depend on how inflation is measured because we are able to use headline and core real-time CPI and PCE inflation in order to correspond more closely with the A different argument was recently made by Yellen (2015) , who argued that, because the equilibrium real interest rate is low by historical standards, the fixed rate of two in the original 
